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Mongolian herders must contend with the risk of dzuds, harsh winters that 
can kill large numbers of livestock. To do so, they use a mixture of formal 
financial tools and traditional risk mitigation techniques. This paper is a study of 
the interaction between the Mongolian Index-based Livestock Insurance Program 
and traditional informal risk mitigation techniques. The researcher interviews 
herders in Bulgan soum, Arhangai aimag and Galuut soum, Bayanhongor aimag 
to compare the IBLI program’s impact in a community that has had IBLI since 
2006 and one that only received IBLI in 2012.  
This study finds that insurance purchase is positively correlated with 
stronger social networks. It also finds that lower income herders are less likely to 
purchase insurance. However, herders trust social networks to support them in 
dzud years more than they trust formal financial institutions. Herders also face 
substantial basis risk beyond the risks covered by IBLI. While the IBLI program 
is growing in popularity and some herders find it a source of greater financial 
security, this study concludes that more work is needed to enhance other risk 
mitigation tools and to support IBLI uptake among poor herders to effectively 
mitigate the risk of dzud.  
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There is a reason why traditional Mongolian shamanistic religion is 
presided over by the Eternal Blue Sky, and that is because the weather dictates a 
nomadic Mongolian herder’s livelihood. Mongolia has one of the harshest 
environments of any nation in the world, with average annual precipitation of 230 
millimeters a year and winter temperatures that can drop to -40° C (Amgalan, 
2010). Annual fluctuations in temperature and precipitation create natural 
disasters called dzuds, harsh winters that may kill half or more of the animals 
within a herding community. While Mongolia has recently experienced a mining-
driven surge in economic growth, herding remains vital to the livelihoods of many 
Mongolians, accounting for 40% of employment and 20% of Mongolia’s gross 
national product(Amgalan, 2010, p. xvii). 
A dzud disaster can be the result of several types of weather phenomenon 
that lead to animal fatality. Eriksen (2014) marks several of the more common 
types as “white dzud,” “black dzud,” “icy dzud,” “cold dzud,” and “hoofed dzud.” 
In a white dzud, excessive snow covers up the grass, inhibiting grazing, while a 
black dzud is marked by too little snow that may force herders to choose between 
abandoning their waterless winter pastures or going to areas with better water and 
little grass. Icy dzuds happen when the top layer of snow melts and refreezes, 
leaving animals locked out of the grass. Finally, hoofed dzuds occur when the 
land is overgrazed and animals cannot get enough grass to eat. Most of these 
types of dzud occur following a summer drought, which leaves the animals with 
little pasture so they cannot gain the nutrition needed to survive the winter. 
Following the disastrous 2000-2002 dzuds in which 11 million head of 
livestock--a third of Mongolia’s herd-- died of frost and starvation, wiping away 
the assets of thousands of Mongolians, the World Bank and the Mongolian 
government began a search for a way mitigate dzud risk for herders (Mahul & 
Skees, 2007). After several years of research and consideration, they found one in 
index-based livestock insurance, abbreviated as IBLI. Index-based insurance is an 
insurance policy that gives out payments based on an indicator correlated with a 
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specific type of loss. For example, crop insurance may be indexed to temperature 
and rainfall, or flood insurance may be indexed to rainfall. The Mongolian 
IBLI program started by the World Bank and the Mongolian government in 2005 
is indexed to winter mortality by species. Measurements are made at the level of 
the country’s 256 soums, Mongolian administrative units akin to counties. In this 
program’s design, herders receive payouts equal to the fraction of the soum’s 
animals that died. Payments begin once a species’ winter mortality in the soum 
rises above 5 or 6 percent, depending on the policy (Mahul & Skees, 2007). For 
example, if a herder insured 100 goats and 20% of the soum’s goats died that 
winter, they would receive a payout equal to the worth of 20 goats. This is 
independent of the hypothetical herder’s own losses: whether they personally lost 
10 goats or 50, the payout is the same.  
In my research, I address the question of how herders use IBLI and other 
risk mitigation strategies to deal with the risk of livestock mortality. In particular, 
this study looks at what factors play into herder’s decisions to purchase livestock 
insurance and what tools herders actually use to cope with dzud risk. Most 
writings to date about the IBLI program focus on the macro-level disbursement of 
funds and examine IBLI without looking at other risk mitigation techniques used 
by herders. In my research, I examine IBLI as one among a set of tools that 
herders use for risk mitigation, and I interviewed herders themselves to get their 
perspectives on whether the IBLI program is helpful or not.  
This issue of risk management is both important and urgent to face. The 
risk of dzud is likely to become more severe with time as Mongolia experiences 
the impacts of climate change. Over the last 70 years, Mongolia’s mean summer 
temperature has become hotter by 2.1°C, and the winters have become colder over 
the last two decades(Namkhainyam, 2009, p. 25). Combined with an increase in 
the volatility of annual precipitation levels, these climate change effects are 
expected to drastically increase the risk of dzud in the decades to come. 
(Namkhainyam, 2009) For nomadic pastoralism to continue to produce a viable 
livelihood for herders, Mongolia needs mechanisms to keep the monumental—
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and increasing—risk of losing livestock to dzud or drought from overwhelming 
Mongolian herders. 
Historical Background 
The need for IBLI only appeared after the collapse of Mongolia’s socialist 
government in 1992. During the rule of the Mongolian People’s Republic, 
Mongolia’s livestock herds were nationalized starting in the 1950s and remained 
so until the MPR’s collapse in the 1990s (Baival & Fernandez-Gimenez, 2012).  
During this time, the vast majority of livestock was owned by the state, although 
herders were allowed to keep personal herds of 100 or fewer animals. The 
Socialist government played a central role in dealing with the risk of dzud. 
Herders worked as part of collectives which could move large single-species 
herds across the landscape, their mobility facilitated by the trucks and equipment 
of the collective farms (Humphrey, 1999, p. 11). In harsh years, the collectives 
could travel vast distances to bring their herds to better pasture. These movements 
mimicked a traditional Mongolian strategy for dealing with poor weather, a trip 
called an otor that involves taking the animals to a different region in years when 
the pasture was poor. MPR farms produced large amounts of hay for the winter on 
collective farms and provided low-cost veterinary care (Baival & Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2012, p. 10). When massive losses did occur, the Socialist government 
would help restock the collectives with animals from other areas of Mongolia.  
Following Mongolia’s democratic transition in 1990, the new government 
rapidly privatized Mongolia’s herds and dismantled the collectives. This and the 
sharp economic downturn Mongolia experienced in the early 90s led to a surge in 
the number of herders, as unemployed city-dwellers claimed their shares of the 
national herd and moved to the countryside. The number of herding families rose 
from 147,000 in 1990 to 284,000 in 1995, marking an enormous migration of the 
Mongolian population. (Amgalan, 2010) It also shifted the burden of livestock 
mortality risk from the state onto the herders, a state of affairs that had not 
occurred in the lifetimes of the herders alive at the time.  
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To worsen the situation, the socialist institutions that lessened the impact 
of dzud on the herds collapsed. The former collective haymaking enterprises also 
collapsed. Tractors and other farming equipment used to make hay were given out 
to the former drivers of the collectives, who often had no way to get spare parts 
when their tractors broke down. (Humphrey, 1999, p. 56) Those herders whose 
families were not able to acquire one of the former collectively-owned trucks 
during the privatization process also lost access to the trucks that they once would 
have used to go on otor, a series of longer migrations to more distant pasture 
made in years with poor grass.  
Between the loss of collectively managed risk mitigation techniques, the 
increased pressure on pasture from new herders expanding their herds, and the 
shift of the burden of dzud risk onto individual herders, Mongolian herders were 
set up for a perfect disaster in the dzud of 2000-2001. During this time, one third 
of Mongolia’s livestock died, and thousands of suddenly impoverished 
Mongolians moved into the ger district slums surrounding Ulaanbaatar (Barnett & 
Skees, 2006). These severe events brought the issue of Mongolian livestock 
mortality to the attention of the World Bank, which worked with the Mongolian 
government to investigate potential solutions to the high risk of dzud. In 2004, the 
Mongolian government passed legislation allowing the IBLI program to be put in 
place, and the program was implemented in 3 aimags starting in 2006 (Mahul & 
Skees, 2007).  
Traditional Risk Mitigation Techniques 
Herding cultures largely have a threshold herd size above which a herder 
is likely to recover from a bad year, and below which a herder will struggle to 
keep their herd at a subsistence level. In low-income households, there can exist a 
“critical threshold” of resources and assets, such as livestock, above which the 
family can support themselves on a positive growth path and below which they 
have to cut into productive assets to remain at a subsistence level, trapping them 
in poverty. (Barnett & Barrett, 2008, p. 1768) When there is such a critical 
threshold, a sudden shock such as losing animals to a dzud can push a household 
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below that level and into poverty. In Kenya, this number is estimated at 10 to 15 
“tropical livestock units” consisting of 1 cow or 7 to 8 goats.(McPeak & 
Chantarat, 2010). In Mongolia, most individuals approximate this subsistence 
level at 200 animals, though many herders today have herds that fall well below 
this level. Many studies on risk management among the extremely poor suggest 
that they manage risk with a goal of keeping their assets greater than this point at 
which they may become stuck in a poverty trap (Barnett & Barrett, 2008). This 
makes herders with small numbers of animals highly risk adverse, as they cannot 
afford to lose many more of their animals. 
To keep their herd sizes above this point, herders use informal risk 
mitigation techniques. For example, herders diversify sources of income within 
the household, create reciprocal social bonds, and find more diverse income 
sources. (Chuluundorj, 2006) Chuluundorj also found that herders may increase 
the size of their herd to deal with the risk of dzud. If herders have a large number 
of animals, it is likely that even a devastating dzud will not push the family below 
the subsistence line. However, this risk mitigation technique negatively impacts 
herders collectively: if the livestock herds grow too large, they may overgraze the 
land and push the steppe’s delicate ecosystem out of balance. This leads to 
erosion, desertification, and poor grass quality. In the 1990s, the Mongolian herds 
climbed from 23.7 million head of livestock in 1980 to 33.5 million in 1999, the 
result of more people becoming herders after the economic collapse of the early 
90s and herders increasing herd size as a risk mitigation technique. (Amgalan, 
2010). Herds have remained large, and this has eaten into Mongolia’s pastureland 
reserves. A study conducted by the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation, a major donor to Mongolia’s livestock initiatives, found that 
degradation of the pastureland has accelerated sharply in the last 20 years and that 
pastureland productivity has fallen by 28.6% in the desert area and 52.2% in the 
steppe over the last 40 years.(Amgalan, 2010, p. 11) 
Herders also rely heavily on their social networks. Researchers have 
catalogued “substantial material flows” of goods between herding households and 
their urban relatives, as herders send dairy and meat products to the cities and 
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their wage-earning relatives send money and goods in return (Sneath, 2012).  
These urban relatives can offer additional support in the form of loans or gifts to 
help herders recover from losses or deal with unexpected adverse events. Social 
networks among herders also help deal with the risk of livestock risk: herders 
offer one another valuable, region-specific herding advice that can help herders 
make good decisions in the face of Mongolia’s unpredictable climate (Baival & 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2012). In addition, herders help one another accomplish 
tasks such as moving their homes and herds to new pasture or splitting their herds 
to graze each species on optimal terrain (Chuluundorj, 2006). 
The Finances of Risk Management 
IBLI’s design is intended to avoid several of the major barriers that have 
previously prevented the implementation of a livestock insurance program in 
Mongolia. Two, common to all types of insurance, are adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when potential policyholders know more 
about their risk than insurers do, leading to only the riskier individuals seeking 
insurance(Barnett & Barrett, 2008). Moral hazard happens when, because a policy 
holder is protected by insurance, they choose more risky behaviors. In either case, 
these phenomena can push up the cost of insurance, pricing it out of economic 
viability. To avoid these situations in conventional insurance requires vigilant 
monitoring and screening mechanisms, which are often impractical at the small 
scale of microinsurance. In microinsurance schemes, the transaction costs of 
evaluating risk and monitoring behavior can easily drive the price too high to be 
economically viable (Barnett & Barrett, 2008, p. 1770). Transaction costs are 
particularly high in the Mongolian setting, where nomadic herders roam sparsely 
populated areas connected by poor roads. An insurance company could not put in 
the money to go visit every herder making a claim or buying a policy and evaluate 
the health of their herds, the state of their pastures, and whether their animals died 
from dzud or poor decision-making. This has made livestock insurance policies 
based on individual losses impossible to implement in Mongolia.  Index-based 
insurance, on the other hand, ties payouts only to overall soum mortality levels, 
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erasing much of the transaction costs associated with individual loss based 
policies.  
Designers of IBLI also believe the program will indirectly helps herders to 
get bank loans at lower interest rates. The higher the rate of defaulting on loans, 
the higher the interest rate goes, and uncompensated natural disaster losses can 
create a large number of defaults. (Barnett & Skees, 2006). However, when 
herders have insurance, banks can be assured that even in case of dzud, herders 
are less likely to be forced into default. This will enable easier access to financial 
assets overall for Mongolian herders. In a best case scenario, easier access to bank 
loans for herders could help them purchase productive assets, such as trucks for 
moving to more distant pastures, and boost their income over the long term. It can 
also help them take out loans to expand their herds or finance their children’s 
education. The Mongolian index-based insurance program has explicitly made 
this connection, and herders are offered lower rates on loans from Xaan Bank if 
they purchase the insurance (Mahul & Skees, 2007). 
Furthermore, researchers hope that IBLI will help the Mongolian 
government be better able to assist herders during dzud disasters. Dealing with a 
widespread natural disaster such as dzud taxes the Mongolian government’s 
ability to pay for necessary assistance programs. While developed nations struck 
by disaster are usually able to draw on revenues from a wide range of sources to 
deal with disaster, developing nations like Mongolia lack the budgetary freedom 
to divert funds to disaster relief(Mahul & Skees, 2007). Having herders purchase 
insurance not only benefits the individual herders, but it hopefully decreases the 
amount of government aid that herders impacted by dzud will need.  
However, many researchers also have concerns about the potential 
downsides of index-based insurance programs. Index insurance comes with a 
potentially large downside for consumers called basis risk. Basis risk is defined as 
“the difference between the payout offered by the index and actual damage 
experienced” (Akter, 2012, p. 274). In the case of the Mongolian index-based 
insurance scheme, this basis risk is the difference between overall soum mortality 
rates and the losses a herder experiences personally. Even in a year when overall 
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soum mortality remains low, a herder could lose a larger share of their animals to 
predation, disease, or personal bad luck, and that loss would go uncompensated 
by insurance.  
In addition, marketing and selling insurance while keeping costs low can 
be a serious issue even for index-based insurance products. (Akter, 2012) found 
that in the case of Bangladesh, poor regulatory frameworks, a lack of demand 
among homeowners, and the high costs of effectively administering a program 
makes index-based flood insurance far too expensive for the majority of 
homeowners. Demand, however, is not constant and can change with well-
designed research and education efforts. Kenyan researchers found innovative 
ways to reach out to herders by designing games that mimicked an index-based 
insurance program for drought risk (McPeak & Chantarat, 2010). However, these 
marketing efforts may be costly and can push the costs of running a program 
higher than is sustainable. 
Furthermore, (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012) notes that index-based 
insurance can fail to be beneficial to farmers if the costs of switching from 
informal to formal risk mitigation techniques is high, or if they are well insured 
by informal social mechanisms already. Also, volatile prices for goods can create 
a source of instability for household income the index-based insurance cannot 
cover. Especially if herders depend on just a handful of products for their cash 
income, price fluctuations can have a considerable impact on herder well being. 
For small-scale herders who face tight credit constraints and might be able to 
benefit from switching to insurance, they may also lack the money up-front to 
insure their animals.(Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012, p. 7) Also, many of the 
purchasers of the Mongolian index-based insurance scheme bought only the 
lowest possible amount of coverage (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012, p. 9). This level 
of coverage may be inadequate to effectively mitigate the impact of a severe dzud 






This study centers around a comparative analysis of two neighboring 
soums chosen from Bayanhongor and Arhangai aimags. Bayanhongor was one of 
the three aimags chosen to pilot the Mongolian IBLI program in 2006 (Mahul & 
Skees, 2007). Arhangai was one of the last aimags in Mongolia to get the 
program, only receiving the IBLI program in 2012. These program start dates 
mean that Bayanhongor herders have experienced a major dzud with the program 
in place, while Arhangai herders have not. Bayanhongor herders have also had six 
years more of education about the insurance program than the Arhangai herders. 
 
Figure 1: Research Sites 
 
Within these aimags, I chose Galuut soum in Bayanhongor and Bulgan 
soum in Arhangai for my research. I selected neighboring soums in order to 
minimize climate variation, which alters herding practices and weather-based 
mortality risk. I chose Bulgan and Galuut in particular because our academic 
program had contacts in both soums, allowing me to more easily access the 
communities, and because they are located at similar distances from their aimag 
centers and from Ulaanbaatar, the two population centers these soums are most 
strongly tied with. Galuut’s soum center is located two hours’ drive from 
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Bayanhongor’s aimag center, while Bulgan’s soum center takes an hour to reach 
from Arhangai’s aimag center. Both aimag centers are located a day’s drive from 
Ulaanbaatar. Khangai Nuruu national park, as well as a nearly impassable range 
of mountains, separates the two soums. Few roads pass between the soums, and 
travelling between the two is most easily done by returning to the aimag center 
and driving between the two places from there. Both soums belong to the 
mountain steppe ecological zone of Mongolia, with the southern border of Galuut 
edging into desert steppe. Due to this climate zone, both soums raise yak rather 
than cattle, and they have very few camels. They are also located in some of the 
higher dzud risk areas of Mongolia(T. Oyunbat, 2014). 
The largest difference between the two soums is that Galuut is mostly bare 
of trees, while Bulgan’s mountains are 
largely forested. Bulgan herders use the 
trees to construct winter shelters and 
fences, heat their houses, and provide 
natural windbreaks around their winter 
pasturelands. Galuut herders can only 
make their winter windbreaks from stone, 
which are far less effective and far more 
difficult to make. Water availability also 
differs in the two soums. In Galuut, 
herders cannot move to their winter camps 
until the first snow, as their animals rely 
on eating snow to get enough water at 
their winter camp sites. Bulgan herders do 
not have this difficulty with the majority 
of their winter sites. 
I spent approximately 7 days in 
each aimag, with three days spent 
interviewing herders in each location. 
In Bayanhongor, I spent an additional 
Top: Herders in Bulgan, Arhangai load logs to bring 
to herders in the nearby valley. Bottom: a winter 
shelter used by a champion herder in Galuut, 
Bayanhongor. Photos by author. 
Figure 2: Bulgan and Galuut Winter 
Preparations 
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two days interviewing soum officials in the soum center. Sickness left me unable 
to do the same in Arhangai. I also spent two days in each aimag center 
interviewing former herders and aimag officials. I also gathered datasets from 
Bayanhongor’s and Arhangai’s respective Aimag Statistical Centers on the human 
and animal populations in the soums of research.  
When interviewing herders, I used the interview format attached in 
Appendix A. The interviews had four parts: the first about social networks, the 
second about the family’s finances and relation to banking and insurance, the 
third about winter preparation, and the fourth about the 2009 dzud. In the first part 
of the interview, I gathered data about the herders’ social network in order to 
better understand the informal networks of support that herders have through 
family and friends. I therefore recorded the locations, occupations, and frequency 
of meetings that my interviewees have with their various relatives. I also asked 
what forms of assistance they received from their friends and families, and how 
frequently they communicated with their friends and relatives. The second part of 
the interview asked herders about their finances, including their herd size and 
their income sources. It then asks about herder’s relationships to banks and the 
IBLI program. The third section gathers information about the informal risk 
mitigation strategies herders use to deal with winter, including purchase and 
production of fodder, pasture condition, and how they get information about 
drought or dzud. The final section asked about herder’s experiences in the 2009 
dzud. Questions cover government aid received, whether they were covered by 
insurance, and which informal risk mitigation techniques they used that year, such 
as not breeding some of the animals or going on otor.  
Interview sample 
While in Bulgan, Arhangai, I surveyed 9 current herders and 2 former 
herders. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. Herders were chosen for 
interviewing largely by the driver’s suggestion, which he offered based on 
proximity to the host household where I was living. While random selection of 
interviewees from all Bulgan households would have been desirable, given the 
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limited timeframe of the study and my lack of access to comprehensive soum 
records, this process allowed for a greater sample size and reduced transportation 
costs, which can be sizable in the population-scarce setting of rural Mongolia. 
Therefore, the Bulgan sample was centered on the southwestern part of the soum, 
approximately a half hour’s drive from the soum center. I traveled there from 
November 6 to November 14, so most Bulgan households had already moved to 
their winter camps. After interviewing households, I asked permission to take 
photographs of their winter camps, which I received in all cases. 
I was unfortunately unable to go to the soum center to being ill from food 
poisoning on the days I intended to go there. Instead, I interviewed former herders 
from Bulgan in the aimag center, located through the informal networks of 
Bulgan people I had interviewed and stayed with. As fewer former herders were 
present in the aimag center than expected, I was only able to locate and interview 
two former herders.  
In Galuut, I interviewed 10 herders from across the soum, largely in the 
northern area. Similarly to Bulgan, my driver selected the households I travelled 
to, and I requested that he try to pick households representative of the range of 
economic class present in Galuut. This sample came across a wider geographic 
area, including respondents from 9 khot ails, or family camps.  
In both locations, all households approached for the interviews agreed to 
be interviewed. The individuals interviewed were split fairly evenly between male 
and female interviewees. Approximately half of the time, both spouses were 
present and participated in the interview. The interviews usually lasted 
approximately 45 minutes to an hour. Interviewees were paid 5000 MNT for 
participating, an amount equivalent to US$2.50. 
While my sample seems to include a diverse range of households within 
each area, there is a possibility that my results could be skewed by omitted 
variable bias. The most likely source of this bias is that the driver chose the 
families for the sample. Since the drivers were more likely to go to households 
they knew, this may have skewed my sample towards the more social and well-
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liked individuals in an area. If this occurred, my results may evidence stronger 
social networks in the area researched than the majority of herders experience.  
This study may also have translational issues. The translator who travelled 
with me to Bulgan was unable to go to Galuut. While they gave the same 
translated survey in both places, the translators may have given different 
clarifications of the questions, possibly nudging participants towards certain 
answers. This source of bias may explain why the herders in Bulgan most 
frequently mentioned receiving rice, flour, and oil as forms of government aid, 




Results and Discussion 
Implementing Mongolia’s IBLI program 
Mongolia’s IBLI was designed as a three phase program. The first, the 
pilot stage, ran from 2006 to 2009. During phase 1, the program was implemented 
in 3 aimags, selected to represent the major ecological regions of Mongolia: Ovs 
aimag in the mountainous western side of Mongolia, Bayanhongor aimag to 
represent the Gobi and the high-mortality central mountains, and Hentii aimag as 
part of eastern Mongolia. (T. Oyunbat, 2014) This phase of the project was 
designed to test whether IBLI would prove an effective strategy in Mongolia and, 
if successful, to refine the project for further expansion. Two project directors 
were hired in each of the participating aimags to coordinate the program’s 
implementation. In my interview with one of Bayanhongor’s two project 
coordinators, he explained that the project then hired two coordinators within each 
soum. These coordinators were brought to the aimag center to learn about the 
IBLI program and were trained in how to teacher herders about the program, and 
they spent the summer and fall of 2006 traveling to herding households to educate 
them about the program.  
Representatives from the three participating insurance companies then 
traveled out to the soums in the fall of 2006 to sell the policies. An estimated 95% 
of herders living in the pilot program aimags received face to face education 
about the insurance project. (Mahul & Skees, 2007). The project began with a 7% 
strike point, meaning that herders would begin to receive payouts when a species’ 
mortality hit above 7%. Almost no payouts occurred in the program’s first year, 
as the 2006-2007 winter was not terribly harsh (Coordinator, 2014). Despite the 
rigorous efforts at selling the insurance, approximately 8.5% of herder households 
in the pilot aimags bought the insurance in its first year (statistics from 
Bayanhongor program coordinator), and most herders purchased insurance to 
cover only 30% of their herds, the lowest share allowed(Mahul & Skees, 2007). 
Considering the newness of this insurance program and the distance that herder 
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households are located apart from one another, this percentage was considered 
acceptable. 
 
Figure 3: Annual Insurance Purchases 
 
IN 2009, the program’s pilot was deemed successful, and the World Bank 
and Mongolian government moved forward into phase 2 of program 
implementation. In phase 2, IBLI expanded into all twenty-one of Mongolia’s 
aimags. They added one in 2009, 5 in 2010, another 6 in 2011, and the final 6 in 
2012. Arhangai aimag, home of Bulgan soum and one of my research sites, 
implemented IBLI in 2012. As the program expanded, it developed a structure 
similar to those in the pilot aimags. Two program coordinators were hired in each 
soum, and insurance agents and soum officials traveled to herder households to 
advocate the new insurance program.(T. Oyunbat, 2014).  
In 2012, the program had successfully spread to all 21 aimags, and the 
IBLI program is currently in phase 3, the transition to operating the program as a 
sustainable service. The aimag offices for the IBLI program were closed this past 
year as part of part of this transition, since they had successfully helped to connect 
insurance companies, soum governments, and local leaders to promote the 
insurance(T. Oyunbat, 2014). Now, educating herders about the insurance is the 
responsibility of soum governments and insurance companies. Aimag and soum 
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statistical centers continue to compile statistics on livestock mortality for the use 
of the insurance companies. In 2013 13.6% of all herders in Mongolia purchased 
the livestock insurance. Bayanhongor, with 34.5% of herders purchasing the 
insurance, has the highest rate of insurance purchase, and Hovsgol aimag is the 
lowest with a 2.6% rate of coverage. 
Also as part of Phase 3, Mongolia has begun to buy reinsurance for the 
IBLI program. Since dzuds usually hit a large area of Mongolia at the same time, 
severe dzud years put heavy pressure on the insurance companies’ ability to pay 
the policy. For example, while the program has paid an average of 100 to 200 
million MNT (10 to 20 thousand USD) per year since the program’s start, they 
gave out the equivalent of 1.3 million USD in four aimags(T. Oyunbat, 2014). To 
protect from this situation, the IBLI program has sold reinsurance on global 
markets. The reinsurance policies stipulate that if payments for the IBLI program 
go above 105% of premiums in any given year, the international reinsurance 
companies will pay the reinsurance markets may also benefit the Mongolian 
government: reinsurance of natural disaster risk can lift some of the burden of the 
government by transferring some of the risk of dzud internationally.  Mongolia’s 
case is similar to that of Kenyan pastoralists, who also face frequent and 
devastating droughts. Researchers found that Kenya could benefit by shifting 
some of their economic burden onto international investors, so that the 
government structures would be less overtaxed in dzud years (Chantarat, Mude, 
Barrett, & Carter, 2013). While the government still contributes to ameliorating 
the impact of dzuds, with the national government paying for livestock losses 
when they rise above 30%, having IBLI and international reinsurance will 
hopefully lessen the economic impact of future dzuds on Mongolia.  
As another part of the third phase of IBLI, the insurance program intends 
to roll out additional insurance products. To make the risks covered by the 
insurance program less covariant and thus less risky for insurance companies, the 
World Bank is designing other products that are not tied to winter weather 
conditions. The first product to be added is crop insurance. As risk analyst at the 
World Bank T. Oyunbat explained, “Crop season is from spring to fall, and the 
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livestock mortality happens in winter and the beginning of spring. So they have 
two totally different risk factors. Even if we have a bad year with the livestock, 
they still can have a good year with the crops.” This will make the reinsurance a 
far more commercially viable product, sustainable into the future.  
Insurance Uptake: Education, Wealth, and Social Networks 
Educating herders about IBLI proved one of the chief challenges in 
making the program work. At the time when IBLI was designed, most rural 
Mongolians had never been exposed to any sort of insurance program. “When we 
first started, all the insurance market was pretty much concentrated in the city.  
They had only Mongol Insurance that had branches in the 21 aimag centers, none 
of the other companies had any branches,” the risk management specialist at the 
World Bank explained. “We didn’t just have to teach about IBLI, we had to 
expand insurance awareness overall.” To further complicate manners, Mongolia 
has the lowest population density of any country and roads and transportation 
networks remain poorly developed, so the IBLI program faced substantial barriers 
in connecting to them.  
To reach out to the herders, the Bayanhongor IBLI program’s soum-level 
coordinators conducted trainings for soum officials, people such as veterinarians 
who dealt regularly with herders, and leaders of the bags—Mongolia’s smallest 
administrative units. In addition, the soum-level coordinators and the insurance 
representatives both traveled to almost every household within the soum to 
disseminate information and encourage sales.(Coordinator, 2014) Both the World 
Bank official and Bayanhongor program coordinator interviewed agreed that the 
success of these education programs depended substantially on the education level 
of the herders. The Bayanhongor coordinator stated, “most of the families who 
purchased the insurance in 2007 were the ones who were educated and 
understood, although some might have just been following the decisions of other 
people they knew.” 
The degree to which herders felt well-informed about insurance varied 
widely between the two soums. In Galuut, Bayanhongor, 70% of respondents felt 
well-informed about the insurance program. In Bulgan, Arhangai only 22% of 
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respondents felt well-informed about the program. This gap confirms that the 
extra six years of experience with the program and education by insurance 
representatives and others has had a substantial impact on herder’s understanding 
of insurance. Herders in Arhangai still held many misconceptions about the 
insurance program. For example, one herder explained that they think it is a good 
program because “we sometimes lose many animals to wolves, and it is good to 
protect from that.” However, wolf attack risk is not covered by the IBLI program. 
Another said that they did not consider themselves well informed because they 
did not know where they should file their individual insurance claims. While the 
insurance salesfolk have left the majority of herders in Bayanhongor with a good 
understanding of IBLI, herders in the more recently added Arhangai still need 
more material to educate them on the IBLI program. 
The question of education is an important one for IBLI’s success. How 
well informed herders feel about insurance correlates closely with whether 
herders purchased insurance in the last year. 20% of herders who did not feel 
informed about insurance purchased it for this winter, while 90% of herders who 
did feel informed 
about the insurance 
purchased it for this 
winter. Herders 
mostly derived their 
information about the 
insurance from visiting insurance 
representatives.  As shown in figure 4, television, radio, and other officials and 
workers played a slight role in informing herders about the insurance program, 
but the dominant source of information by far was the insurance representatives. 
This statistic indicates that especially in Bulgan, Arhangai where fewer herders 
feel informed about insurance, keeping up the visits of insurance representatives 
will be important to increasing the uptake of insurance.  
A family’s wealth also plays into the decision to purchase insurance. 
Families who purchased insurance this year had an average herd size of 399 
Sources of Insurance Information 
Received information from: Bulgan Galuut 
Television or Radio 11% 20% 
Insurance Representatives 90% 100% 
Others (veterinarian, bag officials) 11% 10% 
Figure 4: Sources of Insurance Information 
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animals, while families that had not purchased insurance had an average herd size 
of 191. This is a statistically significant difference, with a t value of 0.02 from a 
heteroskedastic one-sided t-test. The reason for wealthier herders purchasing the 
insurance more frequently is that they are more easily able to pay the premiums in 
the spring. Among the nine herders who did not purchase the insurance, four cited 
the cost of insurance as a reason that they did not purchase it. As one Galuut 
herder stated, “it costs a lot, and I’m not guaranteed to get anything back from it.” 
Another complained that “it’s expensive to cover enough of the herd to matter.” 
Mongolians often cite 200 animals as the herd size required to make a subsistence 
living, so these herders with an average of 191 animals have little money to spare. 
Paradoxically, these herders who are too poor to purchase the insurance are 
precisely the people who would be hardest hit by a dzud, which would cut even 
further into their already slim assets.  
This refusal to purchase insurance due to its cost and uncertain returns is 
not uncommon in the literature on microinsurance. Insurance programs in 
countries without a tradition of insurance face the further barrier of needing to 
persuade people that insurance schemes can be a viable investment and are worth 
making even for individuals existing at a subsistence level. In Bangladesh, where 
a microinsurance program was implemented to protect against potential flood 
loss, over a third of respondents in a study of the targeted farmers refused to buy 
the insurance because they would not receive money if there was no flood (Akter, 
2012, p. 269). As they struggle to meet their subsistence needs, it is difficult to 
convince the poorest sector of the population that investing their money in a 
product that will often return them nothing is a good decision. Furthermore, even 
if convinced that the insurance is a good product, these poor herders may be 
unable to raise the cash to purchase the insurance. The herders who did not 
purchase the insurance make an average of 100,000 MNT (approximately $50) 
less than the wealthier herders in cash. Asking poor herders to part with some of 
their hard-earned money is a difficult  idea to sell. 
Unexpectedly, herders with stronger social networks seem to purchase 
insurance more frequently rather than less (Figure x). As city relatives and 
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friends can help provide economic and labor support in the wake of a severe dzud 
year, many theorists would expect that herders who already have access to these  
informal risk mitigation techniques would purchase insurance less frequently. In 
this case, however, herders do not seem to be weighing the assistance from 
insurance against possible assistance from friends and family. Purchasers are far 
more likely to trust that their friends and families will help them in case of crisis 
(Figure 5), but they still choose to purchase the insurance. 
There are several possible explanations for this correlation. One is that 
these higher levels of trust and social connectivity may be correlated with higher 
wealth, which my study does not control for. Herders with more money can more 
easily send presents of meat and dairy to their city-dwelling family, help friends, 
strengthening their social bonds. This wealth also would allow them to purchase 
insurance more easily. The causal relationship could also run from social 
connections to wealth: having more helpful friends and family members may 
make herders able to build larger herds. One Galuut woman, whose herd consists 
of only 110 animals, explained that her herd is so small because she and her son 
lack the manpower to herd a larger number of animals. Larger herds must also be 
moved more frequently: while nomads with smaller herds move their felt homes 
only three to four times a year, two of the herders with 600 and 800 animals 
Social Connections of Purchasers and Non-purchasers of Insurance 
 Purchased Did not purchase t-value 
Gave a relative help within the last month 81% 73% .12 
Received help from a relative in the last 
month 
36% 12% .20 
Number of employed urban relatives 3.9 3.4 .16 
Average daily phone calls 7.0 4.0 .05 
Helped a friend in the last month 45% 0% .008 
Received help from a friend in the last month 36% 12% .121 
Trust their families to help in case of dzud 77% 12% .009 
Trust their friends to help in case of dzud 55% 12% .059 
Figure 5: Social Connections of Purchasers and Non-Purchasers of Insurance 
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respectively move their homes ten to twelve times annually to keep their animals 
on fresh pasture. This move usually requires the assistance of family or friends, so 
only herders with stronger social networks can make these frequent moves needed 
for larger herds.  
Several social factors did not show significant correlations to insurance 
purchase, such as the frequency of receiving visitors to a family’s ger or going to 
other family’s gers for help. Purchasers and non-purchasers of insurance also 
received manpower help in the 2009 dzud from their friends and family at similar 
frequencies. They also see their relatives with similar frequencies. Although the 
precise relationship between social networks and the purchasing of insurance is 
not entirely clear, it is obvious that alternative sources of dzud protection are not 
significant drivers for the decision to purchase or not purchase insurance. Rather,  
the decision to purchase insurance seems largely driven by the level of trust that 
herders have in the program and the income levels of the purchasing herders. 
 
Uncovered Risks 
While IBLI insurance protects herders from some portion of the risk of 
dzud, it does not protect herders from all of the risks associated with nomadic 
herding. Markets also create their own volatility for herders, as the global market 
dictates prices for the handful of goods herders sell, especially cashmere. Among 
my sample group, cashmere sales accounted for 44% of all reported cash income, 
including 54% of income among Galuut, Bayanhongor respondents and 36.6% of 
the income of Bulgan, Arhangai respondents. In the spring of 2014, the herders in 
my sample received between 60 to 80 thousand MNT per kilogram of cashmere, 
compared to 500 MNT per kilogram of cashmere. With cashmere playing such a 
dominant role in the economic lives of herders, any fluctuation in the price of 
cashmere can threaten their economic status. Unfortunately, cashmere’s market 
prices have been subject to large swings over the last twenty years. Cashmere 
passed through three bust-boom cycles between 1990 and 2012, and these 
fluctuations have been both rapid and dramatic. For example, cashmere sold for 
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$42 a kilogram in 2007, but plummeted to US$12 a kilogram in 2008 (Sneath, 
2012, p. 461). 
When these fluctuations occur, they often have a large impact on herder 
households, especially in regard to their ability to meet fixed financial obligations 
such as loans. Many herders take out seasonal loans that require biannual 
payments, once after the spring cashmere season and once after the fall 
slaughtering season. 47% of the herders interviewed (44% Bulgan, 50% Galuut) 
stated they had taken out loans, and the majority of the loans fit into this category. 
Many used the loans to pay for daily expenses during the rest of the year, when 
cash income remains low for most herder households. Others used the loans to 
purchase cars, motorcycles, or other similar assets. When asked whether repaying 
the loans creates a substantial burden for their families, most herders replied that 
it depended on the year: whether the winter had killed many of the animals they 
intended to sell, and whether cashmere prices brought in the expected spring 
influx of cash. “In some years,” said one Bulgan herder, “it can be very, very 
Figure 6: Herder Monetary Income Sources 
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hard, when there is not enough money.” Furthermore, animals are more likely to 
fetch a poor price in years with high livestock mortality. When a natural disaster 
strikes, many herders attempt to sell their animals at once, leading to a drop in the 
price of the animals (Skees, 2008). Price fluctuations may occur at random some 
of the time, but they also can compound the hazards of risks of dzud.  
This type of income revenue risk creates a large risk for herder households 
that IBLI, which is tied exclusively to livestock mortality, does not cover. Instead, 
herders hedge this risk using informal mechanisms, such as keeping their herds 
diverse, to hedge against this risk. When asked why they herd their chosen 
mixture of animals, most replied that it was because of the diversity of products 
derived from the different animals: goats’ cashmere, sheep’s meat, and yaks’ and 
horses’ milk. While cashmere is sold, the majority of the other products are kept 
for household use. By producing a mixed herd that can provide their subsistence, 
herders keep from fully relying on the market to provide the goods they need, and 
avoid becoming dependent on their cash income. Selling both whole livestock and 
cashmere also diversifies their goods on the market, so that a downturn in one 
might not hit the other. 
Similarly, some herders choose to find non-herding sources of income. 9 
of the 17 herders reported receiving some income from a source not tied to 
herding. In Bulgan, herders made money from cutting and selling wood to the 
aimag center, hosting tourists in the summer, and sewing traditional Mongolian 
garments known as deel. Galuut herders did part time work for more wealthy 
herders, sold dried dung as fuel, and sent family members to work in UB or the 
mines in the southern areas of Bayanhongor. These income sources often added 
on 100 to 200 thousand MNT. While not as much as the average 1.77 million 
MNT earned annually through cashmere, these part time jobs help protect herding 
households against the impact of cashmere price fluctuations.  
Some herders also use bank savings to deal with both market risk and 
livestock mortality risk. Most herders agreed that saving money in a bank account 
is a worthwhile investment: Those herders who gave a number of how much 
someone like them should have in their bank account gave estimates ranging from 
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1 million to 20 million MNT. When asked why, herders responded that they 
should save for their children’s education, in case of a sudden need or illness, and 
in case the winter is bad. In the survey, 90 percent of herders stated that they trust 
banks, showing that herders overall believe that the financial system is a secure 
place for their funds.  
However, the herders also found growing a savings account extremely 
difficult. Only 1 respondent—who owned a herd of more than 400 animals—had 
as much saved as they thought they should. Also, 44% of Bulgan herders 
interviewed and 60% of Galuut herders interviewed reported having no money in 
their bank account at present. As most herders within the sample live at or near 
the subsistence level, with 14 of the 19 stating that they would spend an 
unexpected sum of money on things like food or winter clothing, they struggle to 
set aside money. As one Bulgan herder stated, “Some rich people have a lot of 
money, but poor people don’t get very much. For poor people like me, it is very 
hard to save money and not spend it.” As a result of this difficulty, 8 of 19 herders 
interviewed had no money within their bank accounts, and 3 of the remainder 
stated that the only money within their bank accounts came from their pension, 
government subsidies for children, or herder’s loans. For most rural herders, 
savings seems an infeasible method for protecting against dzud or market risk, 
and keeping their assets in livestock seems preferable. Some herders, when asked 
how much they should keep in their bank account, responded that accumulating 
cash savings was unnecessary. One older Galuut herder shrugged, “Savings is 
good if you can, but our family doesn’t trust money. We trust the animals.” 
Another Galuut herder added that there was no need to save money in the bank 
because they could simply sell animals if they needed funds. Compared to a low-
interest-rate bank account, many herders prefer the returns provided by expanding 
their herds. 
Herders also experience substantial risk to their livestock assets that is not 
fully covered even when they are insured by IBLI. During the 2009 dzud, Bulgan 
herders lost an average of 49% of their herds with a standard deviation of 20 
percentage points. The Galuut sample lost an average of 22.5% of their livestock 
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with a standard deviation of 27 percentage points. These high standard deviations 
mean that many herders’ losses varied sharply from the overall trends in the soum. 
As the overall soum-wide losses are the basis for IBLI, this high standard 
deviation means that IBLI’s payments may fail to match the actual losses 
experienced for many herders. Some herders cited this high variation as a reason 
for not purchasing the index-based insurance. One Bulgan woman with a smaller 
herd who had not purchased the insurance explained, “the insurance would be 
helpful if it covered people losing one or two animals. Then I would buy it.”  
Herders also lose animals to predators, a risk that insurance does not 
cover. Six of the Bayanhongor respondents reported losing animals to wolves 
within the last year. One herder, whose herd contains only 150 animals, lost 10 
sheep and goats to wolves in the past year. A wolf attack can wipe out as many as 
a dozen animals in one night, a potentially disastrous loss for a low-income 
herder. Other herders lost portions of their young sheep and goats to eagles. These 
risks, however, can more easily be buffered by informal networks: when a herder 
loses animals to predators, their neighbors and family likely did not experience 
the same sort of loss, so wealthier family members and friends can give the herder 
some animals or loan them some money if needed. While wolf attacks are not the 
most devastating disaster that can hit a nomadic herder, they can be influential for 
herders near the poverty line, and should not be ignored when considering risk 
management for herders. 
Non-IBLI winter risk mitigation 
 Herders continue to use traditional risk mitigation strategies to deal with 
the hazards of winter. Herders put great stock in the importance of preparing their 
herds well for winter. When 
asked why some herders lose 
more animals than others in 
harsh winters, herders 
regularly cited quality of 
winter preparations, the 
When there is a harsh winter, why do some herders 
lose more animals than others? 
 Bulgan Galuut 
How well they prepare 67% 70% 
Whether they chose a good winter site 22% 60% 
Whether the pasture is good 44% 40% 
Figure 7: Perceptions of Livestock Mortality Causes 
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quality of their winter site, and the quality of the pasture (Figure 7). A Galuut 
herder stated that “it depends on three things: how well they can fatten their 
animals on their summer pasture, how good their winter camp location is, and 
how hard the family works.” Another Galuut respondent summarized it more 
simply:  “lazy people lose animals.”  None suggested that luck plays an important 
role, though the weather’s fluctuations play a large role in determining winter 
mortality. 
What precisely this work entails varies somewhat between the two soums. 
In Arhangai, the first item mentioned is making the shelter warm. Bulgan herders 
bring their animals back to wooden shelters at night, penned in with wooden 
fences. Figure 8 shows a typical 
Bulgan shelter, with 4 foot high 
wooden fences and covered areas 
tucked into the back of the corral. As 
part of winter preparations, Arhangai 
herders also gather dried dung to cover 
the floor of the shelter. This dried dung 
helps keep the ground warm for the 
animals, and must be changed out 
several times over the course of the winter as it is wetted. Galuut herders lack the 
trees to make this type of shelter, so they instead look for winter sites on the 
slopes of mountains that provide natural protection from the wind. In some of 
these spaces, herders also add low stone fences as additional protection against 
the wind. Compared to the omnipresent Bulgan shelters, the rock Galuut shelters 
were quite rare, present in only one interviewee’s winter site.  
Figure 8: Typical Bulgan Shelter 
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Bulgan herders also make 
far more fodder for the winter than 
Galuut herders. Most Bulgan 
herders harvest large amounts of 
grass in the summer and fall to 
keep as hay for the winter. They 
are kept in fenced-off piles of hay 
approximately four to six feet in 
height (Figure 9). Bulgan herders 
consider this fodder enough to sustain their animals for one to two particularly 
hard weeks, and after that they would need to purchase any further fodder 
required. While every Bulgan herder interviewed had prepared fodder themselves 
for the winter, only 20% of Galuut herders had prepared fodder themselves. 
Instead, Galuut herders buy some oats in the late winter and early spring when 
needed. The interviewed herders were not entirely clear on why they find 
harvesting hay unnecessary, but many stated that they just buy fodder when it is 
needed. It is possible that the winter pastures in Galuut provide adequate grass for 
more of the winter, or that Bulgan herders find it easier to harvest hay than Galuut 
herders do. 
Herders also monitor weather conditions closely to judge the approaching 
winter. 81% got information about the upcoming winter from the TV, 31% talk 
about the winter with other herders, and 36% personally watch the sky for the 
weather. Interviewees considered judging the winter a delicate and very necessary 
art. They cited soum officials and elderly expert herders as important sources for 
information about the upcoming winter. However, herders do not significantly 
alter their preparations based on warnings of dzud. “I prepare like every year is a 
dzud,” said one Galuut herder. A shelter only needs so many layers of dung, and 
gathering grass for feed is a very labor-intensive task, so herders do not have 
many changes they can make to their winter preparations. 
One change that some herders do make, however, is to travel on otor. An 
otor is a trip to better pasture made in years when the pasture is particularly poor. 
Figure 9: Bulgan Hay Storage 
 28 
Going on otor is a risky and labor intensive venture: only the large stock such as 
yaks, cows, and horses can usually make the longer trips, so the household must 
split their labor and leave some people behind to tend the sheep and goats. Poor 
households may be unable to go on otor because they lack the cars or trucks 
needed to travel long distances. The Galuut herders who went on otor in the 2009 
dzud went an average of 90 kilometers from their usual homes. Traveling on otor 
also increases the risk of conflicts over pasture: one wealthy Galuut herder who 
traveled to another soum during the 2009 dzud explained that in the area she and 
her family traveled to, “many people told us that we should move on and that they 
didn’t want us.” To keep herders traveling on otor from overgrazing the land they 
travel to, soum governments make agreements on how many herders are allowed 
to travel on otor, how many animals they may bring, and where they may go 
(President, 2014). The Galuut soum president explained that the national 
government assists in these preparations, taking meteorological data and 
monitoring the pasture’s quality to see when allowing herders to go on otor is 
necessary.  
Herders also keep use herd diversity to hedge against winter risk, as well 
as the risk of price fluctuations. Different commonly herded species vary widely 
in their ability to withstand extreme cold, drought, and lack of pasture. Therefore, 
keeping herds with a mix of species allows herders to hedge against the risk of 
losing all their herds to a natural disaster. Keeping diverse herds also has the 
benefit of providing a diverse range of animal products for the family’s use. This 
risk mitigation technique does come with several downsides, however. Keeping 
herds diverse in this matter requires considerable effort on the part of herders, 
since the horses, cattle, and yaks must be herded separately from the goats and 
sheep (Ericksen, 2014).  Furthermore, the animal regarded as most hardy in a 
harsh winter, the horse, also is one of the least productive. Horses are used to 
produce meat and airag, a popular drink made of fermented mare’s milk, as well 
as to herd the other animals. Few families mentioned selling horses on the market, 
and the majority raised only a handful for their family’s use. Furthermore, when 
asked why they keep their herds diverse, nearly all the herders answered that it 
 29 
was because of the diversity of animal products offered by the different species. 
No herder in either soum mentioned the risk of winter mortality as a reason for 
herd diversity. 
 
Experiences in the 2009 dzud 
The 2009 to 2010 winter devastated Mongolia’s herds in a “cold dzud”. 
During the summer of 2009, a drought struck much of Mongolia, leaving animals 
in poor condition for the winter. Furthermore, there was little grass available for 
the animals to eat over the course of the winter. Lacking the body fat that they 
should have built up over the summer, animals died en masse from exposure to 
the cold in the late winter and early spring. As one Bulgan herder explained, “we 
had no grass, the weather was very harsh, and the temperature was too cold. Our 
animals were weak, and then they froze.”  The climatological differences 
mentioned earlier between Galuut and Bulgan had a large impact in the 2009 
dzud. During the dzud, Galuut lost 23% of its total animals while Bulgan lost 37% 
(Figure 10). Losing an additional 14% of their animals meant that Bulgan soum 
experienced a greater impact on their quality of life and their livelihoods in 2012 
compared to the Galuut herders. As such, 90% of Bulgan herders interviewed 
stated that their quality of life in 2010 had been severely impacted by the dzud, 
while only 10% of Galuut herders in the interview sample said the same. Notably, 
the losses reported by the herders in my Bulgan sample were 11 percentage points 
higher than the soum-wide mortality for that year, possibly due to the specific 
geographic area of Bulgan soum in which I conducted my survey. 
Impact of the 2009 dzud 
 Galuut  Bulgan 
Average herd loss (soum-wide)* 23% 37% 
Average herd loss (survey sample) 22% 48% 
Quality of life severely impacted by dzud 10% 90% 
Quality of life somewhat impacted by dzud 30% 10% 
Quality of life not significantly impacted by dzud 60% 0% 
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*: data provided by Bayanhongor and Arhangai statistical centers 
Figure 10: Impact of the 2009 Dzud 
Many herders were unprepared for the scale of the dzud that hit them in 
2009, despite their heavy use of sources of weather information. Herders 
constantly share information with one another and speculation about weather 
conditions, creating a local base of knowledge about winter conditions (Baival & 
Fernandez-Gimenez, 2012, p. 8).  Across both sites, herders harness the power of 
the phone to keep up this constant network of information. They make an average 
of 5.8 phone calls per day, calling friends and family to chat, ask about the well-
being of their herds, and swap information about the weather. They also get 
information about upcoming weather conditions from national weather sources 
such as television and radio. 73% of herders get information about the weather 
from TV, and 90 percent own a TV in their households. Despite these formal and 
informal sources of weather information, only 47 percent of herders surveyed 
reported that they had received warning that a dzud would occur.  
Although not all herders were warned that a dzud was likely to occur, they 
did realize that the winter was likely to be harsher than usual and took appropriate 
steps. After the summer drought, many herders decided to “hold the ram” in the 
fall, meaning that they did not breed all of their female animals. This is a serious 
decision for a nomadic household: not breeding female animals deprives them of 
both herd-expanding young animals and milk products important to household 
nutrition. However, “holding the ram” can increase the odds that their herd 
survives the winter, since the female animals do not have to spend life-preserving 
body fat on feeding their young animals. In the winter of 2009-10, 50% of Bulgan 
herders and 40% of Galuut herders did not breed at least some of their animals. In 
total, Bulgan herders bred 65% of their animals and Galuut herders bred 77%.  
In addition, 80% of herders, the same across the two soums, travelled on 
otor that year. The soum government president in Galuut explained that they 
negotiated to allow families to go on otor that year to several neighboring 
Bayanhongor soums. In particular, several Galuut families mentioned that a group 
of 10 households took their large livestock such as horses and yaks on otor to the 
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south. Otor distances ranged from 20 to 200 kilometers among Galuut herders. 
Some of the herders struggled with the logistics of travelling on otor. One Galuut 
herder mentioned that he had needed to ask around the area to find someone with 
a truck who could help to move his house on otor. One of his friends was able to 
assist, but most of the interviewees who did not go otor stated that their main 
reason for not going on otor was a lack of trucks or a lack of manpower. For those 
herders able to go on more distant otors, the payoff was often substantial. The 
wealthy household that travelled 200 km on otor reported that among the large 
livestock they were able to move on otor, only 5% died.  
While I lack the data to make a conclusion comparing the impact of 
insurance between the two soums, Bulgan households who purchased the 
insurance found it quite helpful to their recovery from the dzud. The five 
households in my sample who had purchased insurance in 2009 received an 
average of 360,000 MNT per household in payments from the insurance 
companies, which 4 of 5 herders described as “somewhat helpful” to recovering 
from the dzud. Four of the five herders who bought insurance in 2009 bought it 
again this year, an indicator that they found it worth investing in again.  
The government also played a significant role in helping herders to deal 
with the 2009 dzud. Herders listed food aid, blankets, warm clothes, and medical 
supplies among the benefits that the government delivered to help herders get 
through the dzud. All Bulgan herders surveyed and 70% of Galuut herders 
received fodder from the government, an important factor in keeping their 
livestock alive. Most herders ran out of their pre-prepared fodder by January or 
February and struggled to keep their animals fed until the new grass began to 
grow in April. While those herders with bank savings flung their money at fodder, 
the government provided some free sacks of grain and bales of hay. They also 
offered discounted 50 kilogram bags of oats for 5,000 MNT. Given the slender 
amount of fodder that Galuut herders in particular pre-prepare for the winter, 
government fodder assistance made a large impact on the ability of herders to 
keep their animals alive through a difficult winter. 
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Figure 11: Sources of Dzud Assistance 
 
In recovering from the winter, herders had the assistance of the soum 
government, insurance companies, banks, and their social networks, but they felt 
the impact of their social networks most strongly. In Figure 11, we can see that 
herders felt their friends and family provided the greatest sources of help. Almost 
none in either soum felt that the formal financial institutions, banks or insurance 
companies, were the most helpful. The most aid came from social networks. 44% 
of Bulgan herders and 70% of Galuut herders received manpower assistance from 
their families. However, a surprisingly large share of herders felt that they 
received assistance from no one but their own households. Especially in Bulgan, 
herders were adamant that they had little support from any of the sources listed. 
“Everyone was overwhelmed, everyone was busy,” one Bulgan herder explained. 
“The only person who was able to help us was us.”  As Bulgan lost more animals 
to the dzud than Galuut, it is possible that fewer individuals in Galuut soum were 
able to help out their friends and neighbors because they were overwhelmed by 
the dzud. Natural disasters like dzud are difficult for communities and nations to 
handle exactly because they harm so many people at once: while soum 
governments and insurance companies may have distributed substantial amounts 
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of aid, the damage done was so extensive that the herders impacted did not feel 
substantial benefits. 
The Missing Former Herders 
Searching for people who had quit herding, in either the aimag center or among 
my informants in the countryside, proved difficult. Only 1 of my Bulgan 
informants stated that they knew someone from their soum who had lost all of 
their herds, and I was only able to find 2 people in Tsetserleg who had left 
herding after the dzud. Herders attribute this partially to hard work on the part of 
herders in the years following the dzud and partially to the help of government 
programs. One Galuut informant stated, “I knew someone who had only 30 
animals left, but he got 5 or 6 pregnant cows from the government restocking 
program in the spring. He worked very hard, and in a few years he had a hundred 
animals or so again.” 
 One interviewee added that 
“some people lost a lot of animals, 
maybe 80%, but no one I know lost 
all of them. We worked hard and 
built the herds back up again.” The 
numbers from the Arhangai 
Statistical Office seem to support his 
conclusion, with the population of 
Bulgan soum remaining almost the 
same between 2009, 2010, and 2011 (Figure 12). The aimag center’s population 
rose from 17770 people in 2009 to 20054 in 2010, implying that some people did 
choose to leave the countryside after the dzud. However, in Bulgan there seems to 
have been no mass exodus from herding in the wake of the dzud. Rather, the dzud 
pushed herders to a bare subsistence level, with 8 of 9 Bulgan herders in the 
survey sample stating that their quality of life was severely impacted by the dzud 
in 2010.  
I was similarly unable to find stories of former herders in Galuut. Only 2  
herders stated that they knew anyone who had lost all of their animals to dzud, 
Figure 12: Soum Population 
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and my translator informed me that they were both referring to the same family. 
One of my herder respondents stated that he himself had lost all of his animals in 
the dzud. He had been unable to take proper care of his animals that winter 
because his father was ill, and he couldn’t get the manpower to move his animals 
to better pasture. After the dzud, he reported, the soum had a meeting where local 
herders who were less impacted by the winter contributed animals to help two 
severely impacted herder families restart their herds, and his was one of the two 
families chosen. Five years after the dzud, he now has a herd of 110 animals, a 
fraction of the 400 animals he lost and hardly enough to sustain him at a 
subsistence level. As such, he works part time for some of the wealthier herders in 
the area to earn money and livestock products.  
One possible explanation for the lack of former herders is that there are 
few employment alternatives to herding for those who leave it. 35% of the 
relatives of current herders who are no longer herding and live in urban centers 
are unemployed. With this lack of employment options facing them, it is 
unsurprising that the vast majority of herders, even those who lost many of their 
animals to the dzud, chose to regrow their herds rather than move elsewhere. 
Furthermore, many herders seem to enjoy their herding lifestyles and the 
communities that they live in. While some of my interviewees did state that they 
wished they had received more education and could work at a better-paying 
position than herding, many Mongolian herders who I spoke to informally and in 
the context of my interviews mentioned that they take pride in their lives as 





Index-based livestock insurance is joining a larger set of tools to help with 
winter risk mitigation in Mongolia. Mongolian society has struggled with the risk 
of dzud for generations, and those challenges are likely to only get worse over the 
coming decades as global warming further destabilizes Mongolia’s already 
volatile climate. A large share of the damage caused by this phenomenon seems 
likely to land on the shoulders of individual herders, a heavy and damaging 
burden. In the face of this phenomenon, herders need more support beyond that 
provided by their friends and relatives. When a dzud can destroy half of a herder’s 
assets over the course of a single winter, there is a need for formal institutions to 
mitigate the damage caused, and IBLI seems a natural solution in the age of the 
market. 
As IBLI moves into Phase 3 and looks for ways to integrate as a sustainable 
institution, the IBLI program needs to keep up door-to-door education and sales 
efforts, especially in the aimags more recently added to the IBLI program. 
Building trust for this program is not an easy task. Most herders have never held 
any form of insurance before, so creating confidence in IBLI requires building 
trust in the institution of formal insurance from the ground up. As most of these 
herders exist at a subsistence level where any extra funds are likely to go to basic 
needs, convincing herders to actually purchase IBLI requires salesmen to 
convince herders that IBLI is not just a useful tool, but so important to their way 
of life that it is worth giving up on important purchases to possess. While I had 
hoped to analyze whether having strong informal networks of support discouraged 
the purchase of insurance, I found that signal overwhelmed in my data by the 
powerful impact of education, trust, and wealth on herder’s decisions to purchase 
insurance. From my research, it seems that education and wealth are two of the 
most important factors in influencing insurance purchases. 
Insurance representatives and local government officials are best positioned to 
build the type of trust necessary to make IBLI successful.  Areas such as Bulgan, 
Arhangai gain most of their information about the IBLI program from the in-
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person visits of insurance salespeople and soum officials, and they do not fully 
trust the program yet. In Bulgan, only 22% of herders feel well-informed about 
insurance and only 25% trust the insurance to make payments when needed. This 
is almost the flip of the Galuut herders, 70% of whom feel well-informed and 
90% who trust the insurance to make payments when needed. The combination of 
longer exposure, more in-depth education about the insurance, and seeing the 
insurance pay out in the context of a severe dzud has taught Bulgan herders that 
IBLI is a worthwhile protection against dzud risk. While IBLI can likely begin to 
pull back on heavy education efforts in areas like Galuut that trust and understand 
the program, areas like Bulgan still need more intensive and in-person education 
to help them feel comfortable around the program. As IBLI starts to remove some 
of the local structures used to first create the program such as the aimag 
coordinating offices, they should be careful not to remove the local on-the-ground 
education programs in places that have only recently received the program. 
However, IBLI alone is not enough to protect herders, especially the poorest 
and most vulnerable to dzud risk, from the effects of natural disaster. For herders 
on the edge of subsistence, purchasing insurance requires them to give up money 
needed for subsistence now for an uncertain return later. The data from Galuut 
shows that while poor herders in the Galuut area feel relatively educated about 
IBLI, they cannot or will not pay for coverage on enough of their herds to make a 
serious difference. To protect these poor populations, the government will have to 
take further actions to help support informal risk mitigation institutions and to 
make insurance less expensive for low-income herders.  
This is especially necessary because of the risks that the program fails to 
cover. It is not economically viable to sell insurance protecting herders from 
individual loss connected to wolf attacks or winter loss beyond what IBLI’s index 
marks, but these risks weigh substantially on the minds of herders. Especially for 
small herders, the loss of ten or twelve animals to predators or winter can be a 
serious economic shock. The greatest danger of the IBLI program is that it may be 
painted as a panacea for herder’s risk of livestock loss, which it is decidedly not. 
When planning for severe winter, Mongolia needs to keep in mind that herders 
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will lose varying shares of animals and may need different types of assistance in 
the dzud’s wake. Projects like restocking programs can help provide this type of 
after-the-fact support for rebuilding after livestock loss. 
One important institution for protecting against livestock loss in general is 
maintaining reserve pastures for otor. In harsh years such as 2009-10, almost all 
herders traveled to otor pastures to find better grass for their animals. Preserving 
quality pastures allows this institution to continue: if even otor pastures are 
overgrazed, herders lose the flexibility to use other pastures when their usual 
areas are experiencing a year of poor growth. Mongolia’s pasture quality is 
inherently volatile and changes considerably over even small differences: despite 
the proximity of Galuut and Bulgan, herders in the two locations face different 
winter challenges and may have quite different livestock losses in any given year. 
Some local governments are currently supporting anti-overgrazing measures such 
as creating leases for grazing lands and setting aside reserve pastures, and these 
efforts need to be supported into the future. 
In addition, more support is needed for employment outside of herding. At 
present, even herders who lose devastingly large amounts of their herds to dzud 
continue herding, though they often become trapped at with a herd size well 
below the 200 animals considered necessary for subsistence. This is a classic 
poverty trap, where people who experience a severe economic shock may be 
unable to ever build up their assets again and may be permanently pushed into a 
poor standard of living. Given the high proportion of herders’ relatives living in 
soum and aimag centers who are unemployed, it is likely that many of these 
herders choose to stay on the land despite their small herds because they have no 
feasible economic alternatives. If more job opportunities existed outside of 
nomadic herding, people who fall through the safety nets of dzud protections and 
are unable to build their herd up again would be able to find other sources of 
economic employment that could better support their families. The fact that so 
few herders leave the land after a dzud is not inherently a sign that herders are 
recovering well: it is also a sign that there are few opportunities for them 
elsewhere. 
 38 
For herders, IBLI is slowly earning a place alongside the support of kinship 
networks and soum governments as a way to reduce the impacts of dzud on their 
livelihoods, as increasing shares of the population understand and trust the 
program. However, uptake on IBLI remains low, with only 30% of herders 
purchasing the product even in Bayanhongor, the aimag with the highest purchase 
rate in Mongolia. If it becomes more widespread, IBLI could substantially benefit 
the government’s ability to effectively mobilize and help herders in dzud years, 
and also provide a greater level of financial security for herders. In time, if formal 
financial risk mitigation techniques improve, herders may be able to rely less 
heavily on high-cost risk mitigation techniques such as raising too large of herds 
and raising animals of less productive species. At the moment, however, IBLI has 
too weak an influence to foster this sort of systematic change. It leaves out 
important demographics and ignores the high variability of dzud year losses. To 
create a more resilient system of herding for the challenges Mongolian herders 








Akter, S. (2012). The role of microinsurance as a safety net against 
environmental risks in Bangladesh. The journal of environment & 
development, 21(2), 263-280. doi: 10.1177/1070496512442505 
Amgalan, O. A., D; Batbuyan, B; Batmandankh, A; Binswanger-Mkhize, 
Hans. (2010). Livelihood Study of Herders in Mongolia (pp. 1-75). 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Mongolian Society for Range Management. 
Baival, B., & Fernandez-Gimenez, M. E. (2012). Meaningful Learning For 
Resilience-Building Among Mongolian Pastoralists. Nomadic 
Peoples, 16(2), 53-77. doi: 10.3167/np.2012.160205 
Barnett, B. J., & Barrett, C. B. (2008). Poverty traps and index-based risk 
transfer products. World Development, 36(10), 1766-1785. doi: 
10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.10.016 
Barnett, B. J., & Skees, J. R. (2006). Enhancing microfinance using index-
based risk-transfer products. Agricultural finance review, 66(2), 235-
250. doi: 10.1108/00214660680001189 
Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P. (2012). Is There Too Much Hype about Index-
based Agricultural Insurance? Journal of Development Studies, 48(2), 
187-200. doi: Doi 10.1080/00220388.2011.625411 
Chantarat, S., Mude, A. G., Barrett, C. B., & Carter, M. R. (2013). Designing 
index-based livestock insurance for managing asset risk in 
Northern Kenya. The Journal of risk and insurance, 80(1), 205-237. doi: 
10.1111/j.1539-6975.2012.01463.x 
Chuluundorj, O. (2006). A multi-level study of vulnerability of Mongolian 
pastoralists to natural hazards and its consequences on individual and 
household well-being. (Dissertation/Thesis), ProQuest, UMI 






www.summon.com   
Coordinator, B. I. P. (2014) (Tsaage, Trans.). In K. Larson (Ed.). 
Ericksen, A. (2014). Politics of responsibility in an increasingly hazardous 
climate: The case of herding in post-socialist Mongolia. 








www.summon.com   
Humphrey, C. S., David. (1999). The End of Nomadism? Society, State and the 
Environment in Inner Asia. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Mahul, O., & Skees, J. (2007). Managing Agricultural Risk At The Country 
Level : The Case Of Index-Based Livestock Insurance In Mongolia 
(pp. 1-37). 
McPeak, J., & Chantarat, S. (2010). Explaining index-based livestock 
insurance to pastoralists. Agricultural finance review, 70(3), 333-352. 
doi: 10.1108/00021461011088477 
Namkhainyam, D. D. L. N. J. D. b. (2009). Mongolia Assessment Report on 
Climate Change 2009.  Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Ministry of the 
Environment, Nature, and Tourism. 
President, G. S. (2014). In K. Larson (Ed.). 
Skees, J. R. (2008). Innovations in index insurance for the poor in lower 
income countries. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 37(1), 
1-15.  
Sneath, D. (2012). The ‘age of the market’ and the regime of debt: the role 
of credit in the transformation of pastoral Mongolia. Social 
Anthropology, 20(4), 458-473. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8676.2012.00223.x 




Appendix 1: Herder Survey 
Part 1: Social Relations 
1. Please list all family members who live in your household. 
Relationship Gender Age 
   
   
   
   
   
2. Please list other family members (parents, children, siblings, and other 
close relatives) 
Relationship Gender Age Occupation Residency Frequency 
of meeting 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
3. Have you received any help from them during the last month? 
a. If so, what?  
4. Have you given any help to them during the last month? 
a. If so, what?  
5. In the past week, how many times have people have visited your ger? 
a. What do they do visit for?  
6. In the past week, how many times have people from your household 
visited other gers?  
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a. What do they visit for? 
7. How many people do you talk with on the telephone a day? 
a. What do you talk with them about? 
8. In the last month, have you received any help from your friends? 
a. If so, what?  
9. Have you given any help to them during the last month? 
a. If so, what?  
Part 2: Finances and Assets 
1. How long have you been herding?  






3. Do you herd any animals that are not your own?  
a. If so, whose and how many? 
4. Why do you herd this mixture of animals?  
5. How many animals did you sell this year?  
6. How many animals have you given as gifts this year?  
7. How many of animals have you slaughtered for your own use this year?  
8. How many animals have you lost to theft, disease, or predators this last 
year?  
9. How much money did you make since last November from:  
a. Selling cashmere? 
b. Selling wool? 
c. Selling livestock? 
d. Selling meat? 
e. Selling hides and skins? 
f. Selling dairy? 
10. Does your family make money from anything other than herding? 
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a. If so, what and how much?  
11. Does your family own any of the following things: 
a. TV 
b. Radio 
c. Solar Panel 




h. Extra ger 
12. If your family got an unexpected sum of money, what would you spend it 
on?  
13. Does your family have a bank account?  
a. If so, how much do you have in it?  
b. How often do you visit the bank? 
c. Are you saving for anything specific? If so, what? 
d. Do you see banks as trustworthy? 
e. How much money do you think that someone like you should keep 
in their bank account? 
14. Do you have access to bank loans if they are needed? 
a. Do you currently have any loans? If so, what did you take them out 
for? 
b. Does repaying your loans create little burden, some burden, or a 
large burden for your family?  
15. Have you ever purchased livestock insurance?  
a. If yes, what was the first year you purchased livestock insurance?  
b. Where did you purchase the livestock insurance? 
c. (Whether yes or no) Why did you buy/not buy the insurance? 
d. Did you purchase livestock insurance this year?  
e. If so, for what percentage of your stock?  
16. Do you feel well-informed about insurance?  
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17. What sources did you get information about insurance from?  
18. Do you think insurance is cheap, expensive, or reasonably priced?  
19. Do you trust the insurance program to give out payments when it is 
needed?  
20. What do you like about the insurance program?  
21. What do you dislike about the insurance program? 
 
Part 3: Winter preparation 
1. How many kilometers does your house move a year?  
2. How many times do you move a year?  
3. Do you have a lease for your winter camp? 
4. Has there been conflict over pasture in this area? 
5. How much fodder have you prepared for your animals?  
6. Did you buy any fodder this year? 
7. How long would your fodder feed your animals if they couldn’t graze?  
8. What type of animal do you think survives best in harsh winters?  
9. Where do you get information about whether there will be drought or 
dzud? 
10. What do you do to prepare for winter?  
11. When there is a harsh winter, why do some herders lose fewer animals than 
other herders?  
12. Is your winter pasture in good condition, a bit degraded, or very degraded?  
13. Is your summer pasture in good condition, a bit degraded, or very 
degraded?  
 
Part 4: 2009 dzud 
1. Before the 2009 dzud, how many animals did you own?  
2. How many animals did you lose in the dzud?  
3. Did you get any extra manpower help from your friends or relatives?  
4. How long were you able to feed your animals with fodder you had bought 
or prepared?  
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5. Did you get fodder from the government?  
6. Did you buy fodder? If so, how much?  
7. Did you get any other forms of aid from the government? 
8. Did you have insurance during the dzud?  
a. If so, how much did they pay?  
b. Was the insurance payment very helpful, a little helpful, or did it 
make little difference?  
c. Were you happy with your interaction with the insurance 
company?  
9. Did you receive any warning about the possibility of dzud?  
10. How did you respond to this warning?  
11. How many of your animals did you breed that year?  
12. Did you go on otor that year?  
13. Did you have any conflicts over water or grazing land?  
14. Did you have a well-kept winter shelter for the animals?  
15. Why do you think you lost the number of animals that you did?  
16. Do you know anyone who lost all of their animals to the dzud?  
a. What happened to them? 
b. Why do you think they lost so many animals? 
17. Did you or anyone you know get animals through a restocking program?  
18. To what extent did the dzud affect your quality of life in 2010 compared to 
2009? Severely, somewhat, or largely unaffected? 
19. In dealing with the dzud and its aftermath, which of these helped you the 
most? Friends, family, soum government, aimag or national government, 
insurance companies, or banks? 
20. If another dzud happened this year, which of these would you trust most to 




Appendix 2: Consent Form 
(Note: given to subjects in Mongolian) 
Consent for Participation in a Research Project 
Risk Mitigation and Index-Based Insurance among Nomadic Mongolian Herders 
Researcher: Kelsey Larson 
Purpose and Procedures: You are invited to participate in a study to examine 
methods that herders use to mitigate dzud risks and prepare for winter, with 
specific emphasis on the role of index based insurance. You will be given a 
survey about their social networks, their economic decisions, their experiences in 
the 2009 dzud, and their winter preparations. This survey is expected to take 
between an hour and an hour and a half to complete. You will receive 5,000 
tugrik for participation. The results of this study will be written in an Independent 
Study Project paper submitted to the School for International Training, and may 
be later used for a senior thesis at Yale University in America or for articles 
submitted to a magazine journal. The researcher is an undergraduate student 
studying economics at Yale University.  
Risks and Benefits: There are no physical risks associated with this study. 
However, some questions may make you uncomfortable and there is a risk of 
breach of confidentiality. Every effort will be made to keep your information 
confidential, by this connot be guaranteed. Although this study will not benefit 
you personally, we hope that our results will help NGOs and local, state, and 
government officials to better understand how herders deal with winter and how 
they can design programs to help herders more effectively.  
Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to answer any 
question or questions for any reason without penalty or loss of benefits. You may 
also terminate and stop the interview at any time and for any reason, and this will 
not result in loss of the 5,000 tugrik.  
 
Confidentiality - All information you present in this interview may be recorded 
and safeguarded. If you do not want information recorded, you need to let the 
interviewer know. All names in this study will remain confidential and protected 
by the interviewer, will be kept anonymous, and will not be published in the 
study. The information given in this survey will only be shared with university 
agencies responsible for oversight of human research and with other researchers 
so that they can check the accuracy of our conclusions, though we will only do so 
if confident that your confidentiality is protected. Photographs will only be used 
with the participant’s permission. Photographs will not be connected with the 
participant’s name or responses.  
Questions:  
If you have any questions about this study, you may conduct the researcher, 
Kelsey Larson, at Kelsey.larson@yale.edu or 9420-2875, or Mongolian SIT 
Academic Director Ulziijargal Sansarjan at ulziijargal.sanjaasuren@sit.edu. If you 
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would like to talk with someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or 
concerns, to discuss situations in the event that a member of the research team is 
not available, or to discuss your rights as a research participant, you may contact 
the Yale University Human Subjects Committee, 55 College Street, New Haven, 
CT  06510, 1-203-785-4688, human.subjects@yale.edu. Additional information is 
available at http://www.yale.edu/hrpp/participants/index.html 
 
Please check one of the two following boxes: 
 Yes, the researcher may use my photograph (which won’t include my face) in 
research papers or online articles about this study. 
 No, the researcher may NOT use my photograph in research papers or online 
articles about this study. 
 
Agreement to Participate: 
I have read the above information, have had the opportunity to have any questions 
asked, and agree to participate in this study. 
 
_________________________                                 
_____________________________ 
Participant’s name printed                                         Participant’s signature and 
date                                                        
_________________________                                 
_____________________________ 
Interviewer’s name printed                                        Interviewer’s signature and 
date 
 
 
 
